After an awkward dinner, one person smiles calmly while still feeling hurt. Another tries to change the feeling before returning to the table. Why does one try to change what they show and the other what they feel? Their aims may depend on the relationship and cultural setting.
Feeling anger and showing it are different things
A person can feel anger and choose not to show it. Another can try to soften the feeling itself. Both are attempts to regulate emotion, but they have different targets. Maya Tamir, Yulia Chentsova-Dutton and Yuri Miyamoto argue that cultural psychology has too often treated those targets as if they were the same. Their review separates emotional experience—what one feels—from emotional expression—what others can observe—and asks how cultural values give each a different priority.
Distinguishing experience from expression clarifies what a study measures. If a study asks only whether people suppress outward signs, it cannot conclude that they have stopped feeling the emotion. If a measure asks whether someone feels good, it cannot tell us whether their facial expression helped preserve a relationship. A theory of regulation must specify what outcome matters to the person and to the social setting.
The authors reserve 'emotion regulation' for motivated attempts to influence emotion. Culture can also shape which situations people encounter or what events mean to them, but that broader generation of emotion is not their main target here. The distinction helps keep the argument focused: what goals do people adopt once they try to change an emotional experience or expression?
Different models of the self make different goals sensible
Independence and interdependence are two broad patterns describing different ways of understanding the self. In more independent settings, people often understand the self through inner attributes and value autonomy and authenticity. Emotional experience may then seem especially important: feeling good can signal that personal goals are going well. In more interdependent settings, people may understand the self through roles and relationships. What an expression does between people can become the more urgent question.
These are cultural tendencies and explanatory models, not descriptions of every resident of a country. The authors themselves stress variety among interdependent cultures. In some settings, restrained expression supports harmony; in others, warm or joyful intensity may serve a relationship. Even within one society, status and the immediate situation can alter which display is considered appropriate.
Values become psychological mechanisms when they shape the goal of regulation. One person may try to reduce sadness because pleasant inner feeling is itself the desired end. Another may leave sadness intact while moderating its public display to avoid burdening someone. It would be a mistake to call one strategy emotionally honest and the other repressive without asking what each person is trying to accomplish.
Everyday theories of emotion shape interpretation
People also carry informal theories about what emotions are. In some Western settings, emotion is often pictured as a private inner state that naturally shows itself outside; an expression can be read as a direct window into feeling. In Japanese examples discussed by the authors, expression may be interpreted more through social context and need not mirror the inner state. The difference changes how others judge restraint or openness.
If a calm face is taken as evidence that nothing hurt, an observer may miss an unspoken difficulty. If an expression is understood as a social act, the same calm face may signal care, respect or appropriate restraint. Neither reading is automatically correct. The review connects these folk theories of emotion with folk theories of mind: beliefs about whether inner states are private causes of action or whether social situations offer the better explanation.
The theories are learned in ordinary interaction. What parents ask children to notice, what counts as sincerity in a conversation and what a group treats as disruptive all teach people how to read feelings. The point is not that culture writes a script no one can change. It supplies familiar interpretations that make some regulatory goals feel obvious and others strange.
Setting a goal is different from choosing a strategy
A person might decide that the goal is to express less anger, to feel less anger, or even to preserve anger because it helps them defend a boundary. Only then does the question of how arise. One can change a situation, reinterpret an event, seek support or suppress an outward display. The review separates goal setting from goal striving so that cultural differences are not reduced to a list of techniques.
In many interdependent contexts, the 'right' expression is often relatively low in intensity because strong personal displays can affect others. But the authors explicitly describe exceptions, including interdependent settings in Latin America where some more vivid positive expressions support social connection. The shared principle is attention to what expression fits the relational context, not a universal command to suppress.
In more independent contexts, people may prioritize changing the inner experience toward pleasure and away from displeasure. That does not mean expression is irrelevant or that everyone pursues happiness at every moment. The expected benefit of a strategy depends on the goal. A study can misjudge an action if it tests a technique against a goal the actor never adopted.
The US and Japan clarify the contrast
The review uses the United States and Japan as extended examples, not as a map of all people in either country. In the European American model it describes, emotions are commonly viewed as internal experiences closely tied to an autonomous self. Pleasant feeling may be treated as a sign of personal success, making the regulation of experience especially salient. Expression and experience are often expected to align.
In the Japanese model discussed, emotions are more often understood in relation to what happens between people. Public expression carries consequences for harmony and can receive priority over changing the private feeling. Holding back a display may be socially meaningful even while the underlying feeling persists. An outside observer who assumes every display must reveal the inner state might misread this as dishonesty or as failed regulation.
The comparison is useful precisely because it exposes assumptions built into research questions. A survey that treats suppression as harmful by definition may capture costs in one context and miss a valued relational function in another. At the same time, no cultural framework makes a strategy harmless in every setting. Power, conflict and individual preference can change the stakes of speaking or staying quiet.
The evidence is stronger for expression
The authors review cross-cultural work showing that people in more interdependent settings often report greater motivation to regulate expressions and use expressive suppression more frequently than people in more independent settings. Studies also suggest that suppression can carry different psychological and social costs depending on context. These findings fit part of the framework. But a result about outward behavior cannot automatically establish what happened to inner experience.
Evidence about the regulation of emotional experience is more limited. Much of the research also compares Western with East Asian contexts. Strategy use is often easier to observe or ask about than the goal behind it. The authors call for work that measures goals, expressions, experiences and consequences separately, across a wider range of cultures and situations. Without that separation, a theory may seem confirmed by a measure that never tested its central distinction.
This is why a global statement such as 'suppression is bad' or 'some cultures do not regulate feelings' goes beyond what the review supports. It asks who is suppressing which expression, for what purpose, how that act is received and whether the person also changed what they felt. A cultural lens improves the question; it does not replace evidence with a stereotype.
The same moment can contain two sensible aims
After a disagreement, regulating expression may allow a conversation to continue even while distress persists. Regulating the inner experience aims to change that distress, which may take time before the person returns to the conversation. Assessing these responses requires distinguishing what the person is trying to change and what the relationship needs. Calling one response authentic and another avoidant without understanding those aims imposes a judgment that visible behavior alone cannot support.
The framework remains a set of propositions with uneven evidence, not a formula for predicting a stranger from a passport. Cultural values, informal theories of emotion, immediate relationships and power all interact. The authors also point toward other possible distinctions, such as whether people aim to regulate their own emotion or someone else's. Much remains to test beyond the two extended country examples.
The lasting change is conceptual. Emotion regulation is not one skill rated from good to bad, and an outwardly calm face cannot tell us whether a feeling disappeared. Sometimes the aim is to make an inner state bearable; sometimes it is to make a relationship possible; sometimes both. Asking which target is at stake lets the research, and the conversation between people, become clearer. It also prevents a measure of visible expression from standing in for an unmeasured private feeling.
What to keep
- Expression and experience are distinct regulatory targets.
- Cultural values shape which emotional goals seem desirable.
- Evidence and concepts must be compared without stereotyping whole societies.
The nuance
What this story does not let us claim
The comparisons describe tendencies, not rules for every person in Japan, the United States or any other society.
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Source & scope
Culture and Emotion Regulation. Maya Tamir, Yulia Chentsova-Dutton & Yuri Miyamoto. Annual Review of Psychology, vol. 78 (2027). First published as a Review in Advance on September 29, 2026.
This editorial guide is an independent explanation. Consult the original publication for the studies, references and full context.
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