A community asks an institution to acknowledge the harm it caused. The institution apologizes, but the community also wants a say in what happens next. Why can an apology that sounds sincere still leave people dissatisfied?

01

An apology alone does not repair the harm

An institution apologizes for taking children from their families decades earlier. Its leaders acknowledge the wrong and promise a different future. For the people affected, hearing those words matters. But they can still ask who will record their testimony, decide how to repair the damage and change the rules that allowed it. Nurit Shnabel and Johannes Ullrich examine why a public apology can be meaningful and insufficient at the same time.

The review considers relationships between groups tied to a historical injustice, such as Indigenous communities and a state responsible for harmful policies. It does not assume every member of either group committed or suffered the original act in the same way. Group membership nonetheless shapes how people hear the history and how they respond to a gesture made in the group's name. That is why the authors study apologies as social events, not simply as words spoken by one individual to another.

Their central question is what each side seeks from a change in the relationship. The institution may want to show it is capable of moral responsibility and can be trusted again. The community may want its standing restored: the ability to speak, influence decisions and determine whether a proposed repair is adequate. When those concerns are ignored, the two sides can leave the same ceremony with different ideas of what has happened.

02

How the language of recognition changed

The authors place today's public apologies in a longer history. Across Western societies, movements for civil rights and other changes made it harder to treat excluded groups as outsiders to whom justice did not fully apply. Claims for recognition and reparation grew more audible. Governments' apologies to Indigenous peoples in Canada and Australia are examples of that shift. The change did not erase inequality, but it altered which past actions could be named publicly as wrong.

Two research paths grew in this setting. One asks whether apologies, forgiveness and other gestures help groups rebuild trust. The other studies what happens when groups compete over whose suffering deserves recognition. Both begin with the social meaning of a group's history. To see why they can lead in such different directions, the authors use social identity theory: people understand a part of themselves through groups to which they belong, and threats to a group's standing can therefore become personally important.

This history is a context for the argument, not a claim that all societies followed one path. The authors focus mainly on cases where the harmed and responsible groups are identifiable and live within the same society. In conflicts marked by harm on more than one side, the same psychological processes may appear, but the history and the distribution of power require separate attention. Treating every case as interchangeable would already distort the question of repair.

03

The apology and the wish to be heard

The review proposes a useful distinction. Members of a group associated with past harm may fear being seen only through that wrongdoing; some seek to restore a moral image. Members of a harmed group may fear remaining unable to shape what happens to them; they seek a stronger voice and more control. These are tendencies that become salient in certain contexts, not fixed traits of everyone in a group. A person can also care about justice, safety, autonomy and many other things at once.

Consider Canada's residential school system. A payment offered without an apology left many survivors feeling that the government had not understood what an acknowledgment of the wrong would mean. Words were not a substitute for material repair; they named responsibility and gave survivors a position from which to judge the response. An apology can therefore matter because it recognizes who has the right to demand an account, even when money or policy changes are also necessary.

The authors describe a model in which acknowledgment can strengthen the harmed group's agency, while acceptance by that group can help those associated with the wrongdoing rejoin a moral community. But this is not a transaction that anyone is owed. Forgiveness cannot be demanded as the price of an apology, especially when harm continues. The possibility of mutual recognition depends on what is done, by whom and under which conditions of equality.

04

What research on public apologies actually finds

A moving ceremony can create an expectation that forgiveness will follow. The evidence summarized in the review is less tidy. Across groups, apologies have at best a weak connection with forgiveness; effects seen between two people do not simply scale up to collective histories. Some apologies make a responsible group seem more remorseful or improve attitudes without producing forgiveness. Others are questioned because some members of the apologizing group reject the apology or because years of distrust make sincerity hard to judge.

The two groups may even disagree about the place of the apology in time. A government can treat it as closing an episode. Survivors may treat it as the beginning of work that must continue: listening to testimony, discussing reparations and preventing repetition. A model reviewed by the authors lays out these steps, from accepting responsibility and establishing the historical record to post-apology engagement. Its value lies less in a perfect sequence than in showing how much a single speech leaves undone.

The review also reports research on contact between groups. Across multiple samples, members of minorities who felt their competence was valued and their voices heard were more ready to work in solidarity with others. Among majorities, feeling welcomed rather than morally condemned was associated with more support for equality. These are associations that fit the proposed needs, not proof that making everyone feel good is enough to change unequal institutions. The observed effects of reconciliation efforts are generally modest.

05

Why refusing forgiveness is not a failure

An account that treats forgiveness as the successful ending can put a new burden on the people harmed. They may have good reasons to keep the history visible, defend material claims or distrust an institution that has not changed. The authors discuss criticisms of reconciliation language when it softens demands for structural equality. A rejected apology can anger the group that offered it, but that reaction does not make acceptance an obligation for those who received it.

The political setting matters. Some leaders may oppose an apology, weakening its credibility. A monument may acknowledge an injustice while current policies continue to harm the same community. Reparations, testimony and policy reform carry distinct meanings; none is merely a decorative supplement to kind words. A useful assessment therefore asks what control and standing the harmed group gains and what responsibilities the other group actually accepts.

At the same time, the review does not dismiss every symbolic gesture as empty. Naming an injustice can affirm the dignity of people whose accounts were denied. It can help set a shared record and support further action. The difficulty is to connect that recognition with concrete obligations without assuming that psychological comfort for one group measures justice for the other.

06

When suffering becomes a competition

The second half of the review follows a less hopeful route. Competitive victimhood appears when groups insist that their suffering deserves priority over another group's and treat recognition as a limited prize. A group associated with harm may respond to accusations by emphasizing its own hardships. Two historically harmed groups can also compete for attention or resources. The fact that a group has really suffered does not settle whether comparing its suffering against another's will help either group.

The authors connect this contest to the same desire for standing that can motivate reconciliation. If one group feels its history is denied, another group's claim may look like a further threat. In research on conflicts involving violence by more than one side, exclusive victim beliefs have been linked to hostile attitudes and support for aggressive responses. These studies do not show that every demand for recognition is hostile. They ask what happens when recognition is made conditional on diminishing someone else's account.

Interventions have tried acknowledging each group's experience and finding a broader story in which both can be heard. The review warns that a simple ‘we all suffered’ message can be dangerous where power and harm were sharply unequal. It may erase responsibility precisely when the harmed group is trying to make it visible. Reducing rivalry calls for recognition that is accurate about history, not a false equivalence that buys temporary calm.

07

Two ways to judge a path forward

The review closes by considering ways to move beyond contests over moral status and toward conditions of equality. The authors discuss proposals to examine how resources and opportunities are distributed, including inequalities between those with the most and least, rather than treating every policy as a contest between fixed identities. That does not erase the history of particular groups. It asks whether a debate over labels is hiding a change in housing, wealth, health or decision-making power that could be measured and addressed.

For the institution in the opening scene, two tests follow. The first is relational: were the people harmed heard, did they gain influence and does the other group accept responsibility without demanding absolution? The second is material: did policies and resources change, and can the community judge the result over time? Neither test is satisfied by counting the number of speeches, nor by asking only whether the responsible group feels morally relieved.

The article's value is in holding together a possibility and a warning. Public recognition can open a relationship that had been closed by denial. But the language of apology can also conceal an unfinished repair, and the fight for recognition can harden into rivalry. A careful response keeps the particular harm visible, leaves forgiveness to those affected and measures progress in both voice and lived conditions.

What to keep

  1. Listening is part of repair.
  2. Forgiveness cannot be demanded.
  3. Recognizing one harm need not erase another.
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The nuance

What this story does not let us claim

Apology–forgiveness models have political and ethical limits and do not replace material repair.

Go deeper: concepts and optional reading practice

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Topic assessment

Check whether you can explain the idea, not merely recognize it.

Every answer is grounded in the explanation above. Some questions introduce new cases to test whether you can apply and analyze the ideas, not merely recall them.

7 questions4 options per questionOne correct answer
01Which statement best captures the review’s central thesis?
02Which is the most appropriate operational definition of “Competitive victimhood”?
03Which case correctly applies the central concept?
04If two studies obtain different results, which interpretation best preserves the logic of this guide?
05Which complementary conclusion belongs to the paper’s core argument?
06Which formulation best distinguishes “Competitive victimhood” from a superficial label?
07Which limit should accompany any application of the paper to a new case?
Answer all seven questions.

Source & scope

Identity Needs in Intergroup Relations: Between the Age of Apology and Victimhood Culture. Nurit Shnabel & Johannes Ullrich. Annual Review of Psychology, vol. 77 (2026).

This editorial guide is an independent explanation. Consult the original publication for the studies, references and full context.

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